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Abstract: Few studies have explored how schools respond to competition in socially 
embedded education quasi-markets. This study focuses on how state-subsidized privately-
run low-fee schools (S-LFPSs) compete with free public schools in some of the poorest 
epaa aape
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neighborhoods of the City of Buenos Aires. In particular, we explore how S-LFPSs follow 
different logics of action to attract (and shape) enrollment profiting from their extended 
autonomy and some regulatory gaps. We applied discourse analysis on data from eight 
months of ethnographic case study research in nine S-LFPSs. Student selection and 
operational changes (e.g., increasing the student/teacher ratio) prevail over academic and 
curricular changes. Selection is operated by means of aptitude tests and screening 
interviews, and other symbolic artifacts aimed at signaling differences with state-run 
schools and the potential fit between schools and families. We present a heuristic typology 
of the different logics of action systematizing the schools’ responses as their leading 
orientations toward the competitive environment. We suggest that policy inconsistencies 
and deficient governmental oversight tilt the field against state-run schools. Rather than 
ensuring equality of educational opportunity, the policy contributes to shape and deepen a 
highly segregated and inequitable educational landscape. 
Keywords: Private education; School choice; Educational partnerships; Educational 
legislation; Educational opportunities; Principals 
 
Cooperar en el discurso, competir en los hechos: Subsidios a las escuelas privadas 
en contextos desfavorecidos de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires  
Resumen: Pocos estudios han explorado cómo las escuelas responden a la competencia 
en contextos de cuasi mercados socialmente estructurados. Este estudio examina cómo las 
escuelas privadas subvencionadas de bajo coste (S-LFPSs) compiten con las escuelas 
públicas en algunos de los barrios más pobres de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. En particular, 
exploramos cómo las S-LFPSs adoptan diferentes lógicas de acción para atraer (y 
seleccionar) matricula, haciendo uso de su mayor grado de autonomía y aprovechando 
ciertos vacíos legales. Analizamos datos recopilados durante ocho meses de trabajo 
etnográfico en nueve S-LFPSs. La selección de alumnos y los cambios operacionales (e.g., 
aumentar la ratio alumnos/docente) prevalecen sobre cambios los académicos y 
curriculares. La selección se lleva a cabo a través de pruebas aptitudinales y entrevistas 
diagnósticas, y otros artefactos simbólicos a fin de diferenciarse de las escuelas estatales. 
Presentamos una tipología heurística de diferentes lógicas de acción, sistematizando las 
principales respuestas de las escuelas en un contexto competitivo. Sugerimos que dadas las 
inconsistencias en las políticas y el deficiente control gubernamental, la política de 
subsidios profundiza un escenario educativo altamente segregado y desigual.  
Palabras-clave: Educación privada; Elección de escuela; Alianzas público-privadas; 
Legislación educativa; Oportunidades educativas; Directores 
 
Cooperação no discurso, concorrência nos fatos: Subsídios às escolas privadas em 
contextos desfavorecidos da Cidade de Buenos Aires 
Resumo: Poucos estudos têm explorado como as escolas respondem à concorrência em 
contextos sociais de quase-mercados.  Este estudo examina como as escolas particulares 
subvencionadas com baixo custo (S-LFPSs) concorrem com as escolas públicas em alguns 
bairros dos mais pobres da Cidade de Buenos Aires. Especificamente, exploramos como as 
S-LFPSs adotam diferentes estratégias para atrair (e escolher) matriculados, aproveitando a 
sua autonomia e a falta de legislação. O analises foi feito a partir da compilação de dados 
feito em oito meses de trabalho etnográfico em nove S-LFPSs. A seleção de alunos e as 
mudanças operacionais (e.g. aumentar a proporção aluno/professor) são priorizados sobre 
mudanças académicas e curriculares. A seleção e feita com testes de aptidão entrevistas de 
avaliação e outros dispositivos simbólicos com o objetivo de se diferenciar das escolas 




públicas. Presentamos uma tipologia heurística com diferentes estratégias de ação, ao 
sistematizar as principais respostas das escolas num contexto de concorrência. Nossa 
sugestão, a partir das inconsistências geradas nas definições políticas e o inadequado 
controle governamental, é que a política de subvencionar aprofunda um cenário educativo 
altamente segregado e desigual. 
Palavras-chave: Educação particular; Escolher escola; Parcerias público-privadas; 
Legislação educacional; Oportunidades educacionais; Diretores 
 
Introduction 
During the last decades, the role of private actors in educational services provision has 
gained salience globally as diverse types of public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been enacted, 
particularly in low and middle-income countries (Robertson, Mundy, Verger, & Menashy, 2012). A 
major underlying premise warranting the expansion of PPPs and school choice policies around the 
globe is that the private sector can provide higher-quality education in a cost-efficient manner, as 
compared to the public sector. PPPs, it is also argued, may increase educational opportunities for 
disadvantaged students by expanding their possibilities to choose schools, access supposedly high-
quality education and, ultimately, improve their academic performance (Languille, 2016). 
Interestingly, these assumptions apply not only for developing countries but also for high-income 
settings where school choice policies are increasingly targeting marginalized and racialized 
populations in inner cities (Ellison & Aloe, 2018; Yoon et al., 2018). 
However, evidence supporting such premises remains inconclusive. Evaluations of diverse 
PPPs have rendered contradictory results in terms of student achievement, school segregation and 
productive efficiency (Languille, 2016; Waslander, Pater, & Van Der Weide, 2010). While some 
evaluations have found a positive impact in students’ learning and productive efficiency (Di 
Gropello, 2006; Patrinos, 2006; Patrinos, Barrera Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009; Witte, Thorn, 
Pritchard, & Claibourn, 1994), others have shown marginal or even null improvement for both 
dimensions (Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Gauri, 1999; Levin & Belfield, 2003; Orfield & 
Luce, 2016). Moreover, several studies have found negative effects pointing out that charter schools 
and voucher models, for example, aggravate educational inequalities (Alves et al., 2015; Elacqua, 
2012; Fiske & Ladd, 2001; Narodowski & Nores, 2002).  
To achieve a more precise understanding of how PPPs in education work, we suggest that 
scholarship in the field needs to widen its methods of inquiry and scope of research. First, 
researchers have almost exclusively relied on quantitative approaches while relatively few studies 
have used more context-conscious methodologies (see exceptions in Jabbar, 2015; Jennings, 2010; 
van Zanten, 2009; Verger, Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016). This has been the case regardless of the fact 
that policy enactment is significantly sensitive to context specificities (Braun, Ball, Maguire, & 
Hoskins, 2011). Certainly, many of the theoretical assumptions and conditions that would ensure the 
proper functioning of PPPs in education may not be fulfilled or may be absent in real-life 
educational environments. For instance, previous studies have shown that school choice processes 
are far from following a rational, instrumental logic, but rather decisively mediated by structural 
constraints (Ben-Porath, 2009; McGinn & Ben-Porath, 2014; Rich & Jennings, 2015). 
Notwithstanding, econometric models frequently used to assess the impact of educational PPPs are 
limited in their capacity to comprehensively capture or control for the effects of complex contextual 
variables. In comparison, qualitative research methods are useful means to thoroughly examine the 
underlying social mechanisms and the contextual features in which PPPs are enacted. Thus, 
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enriching the field with more qualitative studies might provide a clearer understanding of how PPPs 
in education actually work in real-life scenarios (Klees, 2016; Verger & Zancajo, 2015).  
Second, along with methodological narrowness, research has been limited in terms of scope. 
To date, most researchers have focused on demand-side funding schemes, such as charter school 
models and school vouchers, often considered in generic terms, and unaware of the considerable 
variation between different policy designs. Interestingly, supply-side funding schemes have remained 
largely under-explored despite their historical presence and increasing dissemination in both 
developed and developing countries (Heyneman & Lee, 2016; Moschetti, 2018).  
Unlike demand-side subsidies, supply-side subsidies are not allocated on a direct per capita 
basis, but relatively independently from enrollment. In general, allocation of funding is attached to 
certain eligibility criteria related to private schools’ characteristics. Location, availability of nearby 
public schools, profit/non-profit status, and socioeconomic background are the most common 
criteria considered in supply-side subsidy schemes (Ensor, 2004; Patrinos et al., 2009). By detaching 
funding from enrollment, supply-side funding schemes are supposed not to promote school 
competition. Thus, unlike market dynamics intrinsic to demand-side funding models, state-funded 
private schools are supposed to supplement public school provision while keeping competition to a 
minimum (LaRocque, 2008; Montoya & Frugoni, 2016; Patrinos et al., 2009; Verger et al., 2018).1 
However, the existence of a subsidy policy may not be incentive enough to guarantee the 
expansion of private providers needed to compensate for government under-provision. Also, 
supply-side subsidies tend to pose an extra challenge for States in terms of accountability given the 
diverse, complex and often difficult to assess subsidy allocation criteria. Finally, although in theory 
supply-side subsidy policies do not entail school competition, they may not be effective enough to 
avoid de facto competitive practices among schools. In fact, where State enforcement capacity is 
insufficient to ensure private providers comply with the legislation, chances are high that schools 
engage in competitive practices, adopting opportunistic behaviors (Gauri & Vawda, 2004; Jennings, 
2010; Linder & Rosenau, 2000; Verger et al., 2018).  
Against this background, in this study we use an ethnographic approach to examine the 
supply-side subsidy policy for private schools in the context of some of the poorest neighborhoods 
of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Focusing on the ways in which private school 
principals and staff respond to, interpret and enact the policy framework, we identify the 
mechanisms and practices at play to explore whether—and if so, how—state-funded private schools 
do supplement (as intended by the policy framework) or rather compete with tuition-free 
government schools.  
The article is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the context of emergence, 
process of adoption and main features of the subsidy policy in the city of Buenos Aires vis-à-vis the 
exceptionality of the Argentine case regarding the global diffusion of pro-market policies in 
education. Then, we present some methodological considerations and build an analytical framework 
to study schools’ responses in competitive scenarios. Findings are presented in two sub-sections. 
 
1 PPPs in the form of supply-side funding can be found also in Early Childhood Education (ECE) in both 
developed and developing countries (e.g., Early Childhood Centers in Argentina and Head Start in the U.S., 
the largest federal ECE program targeted at low-income children). As the case presented in this paper, 
supply-side funding PPPs in ECE do not aim to foster competition among providers but to address the lack 
of government capacity to provide universal ECE services. Generally speaking, PPPs in ECE aim to expand 
access to high-quality services for poor and marginalized young children. Strikingly, in spite of the expansion 
of these forms of PPPs in ECE, little to none research has examined their effects in terms of competitive 
dynamics, marginalization and educational inequities for young children (Gustafsson-Wright, Smith & 
Gardiner, 2017). 




First, we present the subsidized school leaders’ general views regarding their role within the 
education system as providers of public education, and on whether they feel they supplement or 
rather compete with government provision. Then, we present a heuristic typology of the different 
logics of action summarizing and systematizing the schools’ responses as their leading orientations 
toward the competitive environment. Last, in the discussion section, we briefly recapitulate our 
major findings and reflect on the equity implications in relation to the supply-side subsidy policy 
goals enacted in contexts of poverty. 
Supply-Side Subsidies for Private Schools in Buenos Aires: Origins, 
Specificities, and Recent Trends. 
By contrast with other PPP modalities, supply-side subsidy programs do not appear to rely 
on a well-established theory of change or a consistent set of triggering mechanisms (see, by contrast, 
the demand-side funding rationale as described by Lubienski, 2006). In fact, in most cases the 
ultimate objective of subsidy programs tends to be vaguely explicit, poorly defined, or even changed 
over time to serve different, frequently local agendas (Verger et al., 2018). This is particularly the 
case of those settings in which the institutionalization of a State-dependent private sector dates back 
to the expansion of mass schooling, as in the cases of Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Argentina (Morduchowicz, 2005; Vanderberghe, 1999; Verger, Fontdevila, & Zancajo, 2017; 
Villarroya, 2002).  
In these contexts where PPPs were established before the “neoliberal revolution” of the 
1980s, more local and markedly endogenous factors have naturally outweighed the influence of 
global trends in policy adoption processes. As a result, supply-side subsidy programs established in 
these contexts constitute a particularly heterogeneous group in terms of policy design and rationale. 
In fact, most of these programs are addressed by specialized literature as singular and highly 
idiosyncratic arrangements—rather than instances of a particular variety of PPP (Verger et al., 2018).  
The establishment of the supply-side subsidy policy for private schools in Argentina dates 
back to 1947 (National Law of Organization of Private Education of 1947 – No 13,047). In its 
origin, the policy aimed at dealing with job instability affecting teachers in private schools by 
allocating public funds for those that proved unable to afford teacher minimum wages (Cucuzza, 
1997). The policy also served a power-building agenda providing a means for the recently elected 
Peronist government to build a much-needed political alliance with the Catholic Church, owner of 
the majority of private schools, and a relevant material and symbolic actor at the time (Bianchi, 1994; 
Caruso, 1995).  
Over the following decades, subsequent laws and decrees incorporated only minor changes 
and defined relatively explicit different goals for the policy—i.e., expanding access in a cost-efficient 
manner, increasing diversification, guaranteeing an equitable distribution of resources among 
different providers. Most importantly, changes in the policy regulatory framework have been always 
oriented towards increasing the amount of public funding for private education while specifying 
surprisingly vague criteria and procedures to decide upon subsidy allocation (National Law No 
13,343/48, Decrees 12,179/60; 15/64; 371/64; & 2,542/91).  
One of the most interesting elements that emerges from the analysis of the subsidy policy 
adoption process is that its premature establishment, together with the disinvestment in the public 
education system registered as from the 1970s, seem to have “immunized” the Argentine education 
system from the later global diffusion of pro-market discourses and policy paradigms (Beech & 
Barrenechea, 2011). On the one hand, the policy’s highly idiosyncratic features are explained by 
these historical-contextual factors. On the other hand, its retention—in Jessop’s (2010) terms—and 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 131 6 
its long-lasting disconnectedness vis-à-vis pro-market global discourses and mechanisms may be 
explained by (a) the difficulty of the Argentine political parties to articulate alternative discourses—
largely due to a historical lack of technical cadres in matters of educational policy in the country, as 
compared to neighboring Chile, for instance (Diaz Rios, 2018); (b) Strong path-dependence 
dynamics and a perception of irreversibility based fundamentally on economic factors—as part of an 
arguably short-sighted cost-effectiveness narrative; And, (c) the impermeability to global trends 
posed by the unchallenged role of the Catholic Church as the main articulator of the discursive 
defense of private provision in the country (Moschetti, 2018a). Consequently, the subsidy policy has 
remained anchored in the essentialist doctrine of freedom of instruction and learning inscribed in the 
philosophical-social reflection of the Catholic Church and disconnected not only from pro-market 
thinking imported from the field of economics, but also from the discursive and policy 
developments of critical studies addressing the most recent debate on educational governance 
(Beech & Barrenechea, 2011; Moschetti, 2018b). 
The subsidy policy currently in force in the City of Buenos Aires acquired its ultimate shape 
in 1991. Arguably paradoxical, subsidies are intended “to guarantee the right to learn and, 
consequently, to choose school in exercise of the freedom of education”, and “to ensure equal 
opportunities for all inhabitants to access education” (Decree No. 2542/91).2 The policy allows 
private schools to apply for different amounts of subsidies to pay for teachers and principals’ salaries 
in some proportion (currently from 40% to 100%). Subsidies do not compensate for real estate 
investment, extracurricular teacher salaries, maintenance and so on, and schools are therefore 
allowed to charge extra –although limited– fees to meet these expenses. As mentioned above, the 
normative framework is not particularly exhaustive in determining and operationalizing the criteria 
that define subsidy allocation. It vaguely refers to “the socio-economic profile of the school”, “the 
style of teaching”, “the need for the school in its influence area” and its “financial performance,” 
without establishing clear eligibility indicators and metrics. Not surprisingly, some studies argue that 
there is probably too much room for discretion in the process and, consequently, while the subsidy 
policy is overall and formally targeted to schools serving marginalized populations, it has also been 
used to benefit middle-class schools in a clientelistic fashion (Mezzadra & Rivas, 2010; Sigal et al., 
2011). 
Subsidies have thus enabled the emergence and consolidation of many kinds of private 
schools, generally depending on the amount of subsidy they receive—and the corresponding fees 
they charge families. This research focuses specifically on the group of schools we pragmatically 
named “state-funded low-fee private schools” (S-LFPSs), that is, private schools (both for profit and 
not-for-profit, religious and non-religious) that receive full or almost full subsidies (between 80% 
and 100%) to pay for teachers and principals’ salaries, and that are entitled to charge very low fees to 
families.3 S-LFPSs are located most frequently in the poorest neighborhoods of the city—often 
facing a shortage of government schools (Martínez, 2012; Musa, 2013).  
 
2 Something similar can be observed, for instance, in the Spanish constitution where the right to education 
and the freedom of instruction principles appear simultaneously and somewhat linked to each other (Verger, 
Fontdevila, & Zancajo, 2016). 
3 While there are many differences between these schools and what the literature usually portrays as LFPSs 
(Balarin, 2016; Srivastava, 2007; Walford, 2011), the “affordable learning, poor household targeted, expansion 
of access, better quality and cost efficiency” narratives are equally present in the case of S-LFPS in Buenos 
Aires. S-LFPSs’ fees usually range from 15 to 50 USD a month, that is between 3% to 10% of the minimum 
wage (AR$ 8,080 in 2017), although it is evident that the comparison is valid only for formal workers 
(Moschetti, 2015). 




Interestingly, during the last two decades, these schools have played a key role in the 
privatization of primary education among middle-low and low-income families living in marginalized 
areas of the city (Gamallo, 2011; Judzik & Moschetti, 2016): Students from middle and high-income 
families have historically accounted for the growth of private education enrollment leading to a deep 
socio-economically segregated educational landscape (for a thorough understanding of the process, 
see Narodowski & Nores, 2002; Kruger, 2014). In contrast, this latest privatization trend has been 
particularly pronounced within low and middle-low income families who live in the poorest 
neighborhoods, arguably adding complexity to the historical socio-economic stratification dynamics 
evidenced in the city. Surprisingly, despite such trend, no new S-LFPSs were created throughout the 
period, but rather existing S-LFPSs have increased their enrollments by 50% on average between 
2005 and 2015, suggesting that overcrowdedness is now a feature of both public and private 
subsidized schools across marginalized areas of the city (DGEGP-CABA, 2016).   
The existence of this long-standing policy of supply-side subsidies for private schools, 
together with the more recent privatization process evidenced in marginalized neighborhoods, 
makes the City of Buenos Aires an interesting case to analyze how this modality of provision 
operates in a real context. More specifically, it offers a chance to gain insight into the relationship 
between supply-side subsidy programs and equality of educational opportunities for disadvantaged 
families, and to reflect on the overall implications of privatization policies targeting marginalized 
populations. 
Methods and Analytical Framework 
This article presents results and analysis forming part of a larger policy, school and 
household-level study on the S-LFPS sector in the City of Buenos Aires. The study’s main purpose 
is to examine the extent and conditions under which S-LFPSs can supplement government 
provision and increase educational opportunities for students in economically disadvantaged areas. 
Following Srivastava and Hopwood’s (2009) framework for qualitative data analysis, the study 
iteratively addresses three interrelated analytical levels: (a) the regulatory framework, or what the 
policy says and does in terms of “rules of the game”; (b) the S-LFPSs’ logics of action, or how 
schools operate within the regulatory framework; and (c) the parental choice rationalities in relation 
to S-LFPSs. 
The results and discussion in this article are based on the findings at the S-LFPS level. We 
used ethnographic methods to explore S-LFPSs’ views on competition and the different responses 
they deploy regarding enrollment under the supply-side policy framework. We selected nine S-LFPSs 
offering primary education located in the city’s poorest neighborhoods to conduct on-site 
observations during a period of eight months (June 2015 through January 2016), as well as in-depth 
interviews with principals, owners, teachers, and legal advisors (n=52)4. Schools were selected as a 
stratified purposeful sample based on the type of provider following the average distribution 
prevailing in the S-LFPS sector. The final sample is composed of four schools belonging to non-
profit organizations (NPO), three belonging to the Catholic Church or to some Catholic religious 
order, and two belonging to private companies. Throughout fieldwork, we explored how S-LFPS 
school leaders enact the supply-side subsidy policy on the ground, unveiling how they interpret, 
signify and respond to the supply-side funding policy in their everyday practices in relation to 
enrollment. 
 
4 All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees and schools have been 
withheld from this text by mutual agreement. 
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Drawing on previous, although limited, research on schools’ responses to other mostly 
demand-driven-PPP frameworks, we developed a non-exhaustive list of potential responses 
followed by schools in competitive scenarios as a preliminary checklist to identify whether S-LFPSs 




Figure 1. Analytical framework. 
Note: Own elaboration based on Ball and Maroy (Ball & Maroy, 2009), Woods, Bagley and Glatter (1998), Jabbar (2015), 
and Van Zanten (2009). 
 
During the data analysis phase, we conducted successive rounds of theoretical coding. To do 
so, we developed a coding scheme systematizing the six major potential responses schools may 
resort to under competitive pressure to attract enrollment. These potential responses are: academic, 
regarding changes in curriculum and efforts to improve quality; operational, affecting how resources 
are procured and used in order to gain efficiency and ultimately achieve economies of scale through 
expansion or the development of partnerships; differentiation, aiming at buffering from competition—
arguably generating a less intense “monopolistic competition” (Lubienski, 2003)—by developing 
academic or non-academic niches, or offering extracurricular activities to gain uniqueness (Jabbar, 
2015; Woods et al., 1998); promotional, developing various types of general or targeted 
communication actions;5 (re)location, relating to schools’ location decisions vis-à-vis the geographical 
 
5 While many consider “promotional activities” and “marketing” to be synonyms (Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 
1995; Jabbar, 2015), we refer to promotional activities exclusively as external communication efforts 
(advertising). However, studies focusing on schools’ marketing strategies in more dynamic and mature 
marketized environments than those created by supply-side subsidies, should note that marketing is a 
complex process in which promotional activities only occur after schools have engaged in other marketing 




demand patterns (Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009); and selection, which can be ex ante (cream-
skimming), or ex post (getting rid of low-performing students)6 (Jennings, 2010; Lacireno-Paquet, 
Holyoke, Moser, & Henig, 2002; West, Ingram, & Hind, 2006).  
Last, our analysis also recognizes that how schools engage in policy enactment is inevitably 
mediated by a series of constraints—or “mediating factors” (Jabbar, 2015). These factors are both 
external (the regulatory framework itself, neighborhood’s and nearby schools’ characteristics, 
schools’ relative position in the local hierarchy), and internal (perception of competition, enrollment 
level, student’s characteristics, history and ethos, and so on; Ball & Maroy, 2009)—and data have 
been coded accordingly. 
Exploring the Supply-Side Subsidy Policy in a ‘Lived’ (Competitive) 
Environment 
In this section, we present our major findings. First, we unfold S-LFPS leaders’ general views 
regarding their role within the education system as providers of public education, and on whether 
they feel they supplement or rather compete with government provision. Note that the no-
competition narrative—that is, the fact that S-LFPSs are supposed to be neutral in terms of 
generating competitive interdependencies—implicit in most supply-side subsidy policies makes this 
point particularly relevant since it reveals the ways in which schools actually interpret and enact the 
policy on the ground.  
Second, we present a heuristic typology (see Lunt, 2011) of the different logics of action 
summarizing and systematizing the schools’ responses as their leading orientations toward the 
environment mediated by the different, case-specific internal and external constraints. By logics of 
action, we refer to “the predominant orientations given to the conduct of a school in different 
spheres of action, through decisions, routines or practical choices, as reconstructed ex post facto by 
an observer” (Maroy & van Zanten, 2009, p. 72). Following Ball and Maroy (2009) and van Zanten 
(2009) we use the concept of logic of action as an enlarged version of the concept of strategy. The 
latter tends to be narrowly associated to an instrumental rationality, whereas the concept of logic of 
action “does not suppose that school agents are conscious of the effects of their choices or that they 
act on the basis of a rational-instrumental calculation of costs, means and benefits” (van Zanten, 
2009, p. 87). In these terms, logics of action can be “strategic”—and most certainly are—but not 
exclusively. 
S-LFPS’s Leaders Rhetoric of Collaboration, Harmony and Equivalency 
As mentioned above, supply-side subsidies in Buenos Aires aim to expand access and 
guarantee the right to choose schools for socio-economically disadvantaged families, by reducing the 
cost of attending private schools where publicly-run supply is insufficient. Theoretically, as funding 
is relatively independent from enrollment, S-LFPSs are assumed not to promote school competition, 
but to supplement public school supply. In this vein, our exploration of S-LFPS leaders’ views 
regarding their role within the educational system revealed that they do not identify neighboring 
 
activities such as scanning the local market (both analyzing consumer and competitor profiles), and building 
differentiation at the product level by means of substantive or symbolic attributes (Zancajo, 2018). It falls 
beyond the scope of this study to analyze marketing strategies from this systemic perspective. 
6 Van Zanten (2009), for instance, distinguishes between first-order and second-order competition, that is, whether 
schools compete for enrollment, or rather for the “best pupils” by means of different explicit or implicit 
selection practices. 
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schools as competitors. Rather, the overarching rhetoric is one of cooperation and harmonious 
relationship: 
I wouldn’t say we compete for enrollment with public schools...We are part of the 
same education system. We are a private school, but we are part of the same public 
education system, then we are public too, I think. (Owner, Private company school) 
 
We do not see each other as competitors. If possible, we try help each other...We all 
work in education... We have been collaborative with other public and private 
schools. (Principal, Catholic Church school) 
 
Families can choose whatever suits them best; they can go for public or private 
subsidized. All alternatives are equally valid. (Principal, NPO school) 
 
S-LFPS owners and principals depict their functions as cooperating with public schools and 
neutrally offering educational alternatives for families. According to their narratives, private and 
public schools are equal, and S-LFPSs have developed helpful and collaborative relationships among 
each other and with public schools.  
Notably, the rationale that private and public schools do not compete but rather supplement 
each other is not only grounded in the city’s long-lasting supply-subsidy policy principles, but also in 
the 2006 National Education Law (No. 26,206) and its 1993 predecessor Federal Education Law 
(No. 24,195). These laws refer to all schools as public, naming private schools as privately-managed 
public schools, and public schools as state-managed public schools. Some argue that this 
terminological turn has had important consequences for legitimating the allocation of state subsidies 
for private schools (Feldfeber & Gluz, 2011; Gamallo, 2015; Vior & Rodríguez, 2012). The way S-
LFPS owners and principals conceive and make sense of their roles within the educational system is 
consistent with this legal framework. They explicitly reject the idea of competition and view 
themselves as public servers. In one principal’s words, S-LFPSs “are part of the same public 
education system… so [S-LFPSs] are public too.”  
Moreover, S-LFPS leaders were reluctant to criticize public schools. The following exchange 
with a school principal serves as an example:   
Researcher: What differences do you see between your school and the public schools 
in this neighborhood? 
 
Principal: There are no differences...I do not want to talk bad about public schools, 
OK? (Principal, Private company school) 
 
Like this principal, at first, virtually every interviewee refused to engage in criticism of public 
schools. Arguably, talking negatively about public schools would entail recognizing a competitive 
landscape, with “better and worse” players, “winner and losers.” Instead, S-LFPS leaders conveyed 
that “all alternatives are equally valid” (Principal, NPO school), or that “there are no differences” 
(Principal, Private company school).  
Notwithstanding this rhetoric of equivalence, private schools are characterized as being 
superior in most S-LFPS leaders’ discourses. To a great extent, they describe S-LFPSs as being 
better than public schools in terms of “academic quality and teacher engagement.” To illustrate this, 
it is worth returning to the dialogue presented above and looking at how it was resumed:  
Principal: There are no differences...I do not want to talk bad about public schools, 
OK? 
 




Researcher: No, of course not. 
 
Principal: With all due respect, I... I think they do not teach anything. The academic 
level is extremely low. Kids go to public schools just to ‘keep the seats warm.’7 And 
teachers as well, I’m afraid. (Principal, Private company school) 
 
In this exchange, the principal declares “there are no differences” between private and public 
schools but continues to say that public schools “do not teach anything” and that “the academic 
level is extremely low.” Likewise, other S-LFPS leaders assert: “Public schools do not bother to 
teach” (Principal, Catholic Church school); “Students from the nearby public schools are very 
violent” (Principal, NPO school); And “[in public schools] they don’t control student attendance 
and families don’t even care” (Principal, Catholic Church school).  
In short, data suggest S-LFPS leaders share a widespread negative view of public schools but 
experience a moral dilemma in openly criticizing them. Further contradictions in S-LFPS leaders’ 
narratives of cooperation and equivalency continued to emerge as the interviews unfolded. The 
following quotes, for instance, suggest that S-LFPSs indeed experience competitive pressure:  
Last year they opened a new public school a few blocks away from here; a beautiful 
school and, of course, no tuition fees. We were scared to death that we were going to 
lose enrollment. Because, of course, we must have students to keep the school open. 
(Principal, NPO school) 
 
It is impossible for us to build relationships with public schools. They won’t talk to 
us. They label us as if we were stealing students from them, I don’t know why, it’s 
just crazy. (Principal, NPO school) 
 
As these school principals depict, despite supply-side subsidies being detached from enrollment and 
of the overarching discourses of absence of school competition, attracting and retaining enrollment 
is still a matter of concern for both S-LFPSs and public schools. On the one hand, the possibility of 
losing enrollment as from the opening of a new public school “scared [S-LFPSs] to death.” On the 
other hand, public schools “label [private schools] as if they were stealing students from them.” 
In sum, a rhetoric of cooperation, harmony and equivalence seems to emerge as a first 
reaction in S-LFPS leaders’ discourses regarding their roles within the education system and their 
relationships with other schools, especially public. While this rhetoric smoothly fits with the tenets 
of the supply-side subsidy policy and broader legal frameworks, a closer look reveals S-LFPS leaders 
being hesitant and somewhat contradictory.  
Interestingly, from the perspective of public schools, it appears that S-LFPSs “steal” 
students from them. However, the nature of such competition remains unclear and is strongly 
mediated by the neighborhoods’ schooling dynamics, and especially by the fact that these 
neighborhoods have historically suffered from having not enough schools (considering both public 
and private) (Musa, 2013; Sigal et al., 2011). As one Catholic Church S-LFPS principal put it: 
“Fortunately or unfortunately, there’s ‘fish for all’ in this district”. This feature is particularly relevant 
because it helps to understand that in marginalized contexts, contrary to what global school choice 
discourses tend to assume, power to choose remains essentially on the supply side. 
Worth considering, while competition dynamics are more evident when supply clearly 
outstrips demand and forces under-enrolled schools to close, competition can take more subtle 
 
7 Argentine saying referring to the act of being physically present at one’s workplace but not in fact working. 
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forms and schools may compete for enrollment and resources but simultaneously for other less 
obvious forms of capital, such as prestige and reputation. Prestige and reputation, as many have 
noted, are some of the most relied on proxies used by families in their school choice decisions; so, 
for schools, prestige and reputation increase desirability and may lead to success in enrollment. 
However, in education services production, competition for prestige is closely linked with 
competition for certain types of students. As noted by Van Zanten (2009, p. 86): “In all service 
professions, the characteristics of clients strongly modify work content and occupational prestige. 
This triggers a ‘second-order’ competition between schools to get the best—usually conceived as the 
most academically able—students.” Arguably then, public schools in the area feel threatened by the 
existence of S-LFPSs not because they might end up having less students—which is most unlikely 
given the current demand-supply imbalance—but probably “less academically able” ones. In other 
words, second-order competition is to be thought of as a mechanism resulting in public schools 
having to serve a greater number of marginalized students. 
Ideal-Type Competitive Logics of Action Developed by S-LFPSs  
This sub-section presents the typology of logics of action identified from our data. S-LFPSs 
were classified based on the different competitive responses they developed (academic, operational, 
and so on) and considering the frequently associated internal and external constraints mediating such 
responses in each case. Using these criteria of classification, we identified three different heuristic 
ideal types of logics of action: (a) Highly-selective S-LFPSs; (b) Focused S-LFPSs; and (c) Missionary 
S-LFPSs. These need to be seen as ideal types that contribute to systematize and group different real 
cases, but do not necessarily correspond to empirical situations directly. Table 1 presents the main 
characteristics of each type.  




Table 1  
S-LFPSs’ logics of action. A typology 
Type External Constraints Internal Constraints Practices Logic of Action 
Highly-
selective 
Located on the border between 
squatter settlements and middle and 
lower-middle class neighborhoods 
 
Low perception of 
competition  
 
Significant increases in group size/ 










position in the 
local hierarchy 
High position within the local 
hierarchy  
 
Relatively diverse socio- 
economic status of students 
(low, lower-middle and 
middle class) 
 
Incorporation of full-day bilingual 
program options, while sustaining half-
day option/ Tracking 
 
One or no S-LFPS and no more than 
two public schools within 0.6 miles 
of distance 
Long-established institutions, 
but recently reoriented due to 
changes in management 
entities 
Differentiation through academic 
extracurricular activities, infrastructure 
and other symbolic attributes 
 




 Systematized, ex ante selection 
processes, focused on academic and 
behavioral dimensions / Ex post 
selection 
Focused 
Located in low-middle class 
neighborhoods, close (0.3 miles) to 
squatter settlements 
  
Average position in the local 
hierarchy in relation to other S-LFPS, 
and high in relation to neighboring 
public schools 
High or average perception of 
competition with respect to 
other S-LFPSs and some 
'new' state schools 
 
Mostly middle and lower-
middle class students 
Development of some alternative 
pedagogical approaches / 





position in the 
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Table 1 (Cont’d.)  
S-LFPSs’ logics of action. A typology 
Type External Constraints Internal Constraints Practices Logic of Action 
Focused 
More than two S-LFPSs and two 
public schools within 0.6 miles of 
distance 
Relatively new institutions Moderate increase of groups size/ 
“Low-cost” extracurricular activities/ 
Partnerships with other schools  
 
Development of “integration, caring or 
alternative” niches  
 
No promotional practices 
 
Ex ante and ex post student selection 
based on behavioral aspects and SES 
 
Missionary 
Located in lower-middle class 
neighborhoods, close (0.3 miles) to 
squatter settlements 
  
Low position in the local hierarchy 
considering only S-LFPSs, but high 
or average w/ neighboring public 
schools  
 
More than two S-LFPSs and two 
public schools within 0.6 miles of 
distance  
High or average perception of 
competition 
  




originally linked to the social 
mission of some secular or 
religious entity 
 
Basic curricular approach 
 
Moderate increase of group sizes, 
primary and secondary in same 
classrooms, austerity measures 
 
Development of non-traditional niches 
(“problematic students”, “safe spaces”, 
“care”) /Development of basic 
symbolic attributes (uniforms, façade 
cladding) 
 
Scarce or null ex ante selection of 
students/ Ex post selection in cases of 















Highly-Selective S-LFPSs. The first type is that of S-LFPSs that hold a high position in 
the local hierarchy, both in relation to public schools and to other S-LFPSs. In general, S-LFPSs 
pursuing a highly-selective logic of action are religious schools owned by NPOs that operate outside 
the scope of the Archiepiscopate of the city of Buenos Aires. These schools are usually located on 
the border between middle-class, middle-low class areas and squatter settlements, without many 
nearby competitors. Consequently, they enjoy high and heterogeneous demand. In this context, they 
develop a logic of action aimed at increasing the number of students, while simultaneously trying to 
consolidate their privileged position in the local hierarchy emphasizing features such as academic 
excellence and discipline. In fact, the ethos of these schools tends to be inextricably linked to 
traditional values, discipline and respect for the rules.  
These schools’ good reputation ensures that they have a level of demand always higher than 
their installed capacity, which they seek to maximize by increasing the number of students per 
classroom. Every school in this group had increased class sizes to an average of 45 students over the 
last decade, thus maximizing the use of both facilities and teacher salary subsidies, while collecting 
more fees from families. The legislation does not specify maximum group sizes nor student-teacher 
ratios and, as a matter of fact, increasing class sizes is somehow reinforced by the subsidy policy: 
Researcher: In general, you have groups of 43 to 48 students, right?   
 
Principal: Yes. Honestly, we would rather work with smaller groups, no more than 
30 students per classroom.... I don’t worry about teacher salaries; I have them 
subsidized. But we have all the other expenses that need to be paid for with tuition 
fees. Then, I must maximize the use of the classrooms and teachers we have. Our 
financial equation is subsidies plus fees, so I have to play with the number of 
students and fees to break even. (Principal, NPO school) 
 
Operational practices aimed at maximizing productive efficiency naturally jeopardize the pedagogical 
benefits that smaller group sizes and lower student-teacher ratios encompass. In this regard, a 
teacher explains: 
There are too many students in each classroom. Then maybe ten, 15 children can 
follow your lesson… But then you see some are struggling. We do try to help these 
kids as much we can, but being 40 kids per group, in general, makes it very difficult 
to do individual, personalized work. (Teacher, NPO school) 
 
The high level of demand, the practices aimed at maximizing the use of available resources and 
facilities, and the mandate to preserve their good reputation result in an extended use of exhaustive 
student selection practices based on academic and behavioral criteria. S-LFPSs in this group engage 
in selection practices establishing formal admission processes and usually implementing two to three 
selection techniques such as academic tests, screening interviews with candidates and parents, 
psychological tests, examination of transcripts and academic reports from previous schools. Despite 
selection practices being explicitly forbidden (Law No. 2,681/2008) and most infrequent in primary 
education internationally8, they were openly described by principals and teachers, both as cream-
skimming and counselling out. In two cases, even web pages contained detailed information on the 
admission criteria and process. 
[Prospective students] must go through the interviews and must pass the admission 
exams in order to be admitted… Siblings, little brothers, sisters, cousins, everybody 
 
8 An exception can be found in Bogotá’s charter-like schools (see Edwards et al., 2017).  
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has to take and pass these exams if they want to get a spot. If they’re relatives, then 
it’s easier because we already know the family, but they must pass the exams anyway. 
(Teacher, NPO school) 
 
Then there are students to whom we want to give signs that they should leave. For 
instance, we tell parents: ‘Look, if he continues here, he will repeat.’ Because some 
children are problematic, or they never reach the academic performance standards. 
(Principal, NPO school) 
 
Selection practices result in a somehow homogenous composition of students “capable and willing” 
to focus on academic excellence. This, in turn, makes teaching and learning possible in 45-student 
classrooms. Students homogeneity regarding skills and attitudes towards schooling does not always 
determine—given the characteristics of the context—socio-economic homogeneity. In some cases, 
the tensions derived from socio-economic diversity are “solved” by segregating internally in 
different groups, often based on parental involvement. In short, evidence suggests that these schools 
are further deepening marginalization (by means of attitudinal and academic selection processes) 
within already socio-economically disadvantaged populations. 
Finally, although maximum tuition fees are regulated by the Ministry, these apply basically 
for curricular subjects but admit great flexibility for extras. Accordingly, offering extracurricular 
activities, additional subjects and services, provides schools with the chance to bypass the maximum 
fees regulations and charge add-ons to basic fees. Expectedly, highly-selective S-LFPSs increase 
available resources by providing, for instance, language, math and technology lessons at an 
additional cost for families. Offering extracurricular activities also helps them build differentiation: 
S-LFPSs in this group frequently offer extras of certain academic relevance and develop other 
symbolic attributes always linked to excellence and discipline. 
Focused S-LFPSs. The second group is that of S-LFPSs located in low-middle class areas, 
although relatively close to squatter settlements. Schools in this group enjoy an average position in 
the local hierarchy in relation to other S-LFPSs and a high position with respect to neighboring 
public schools. The perceive a high or medium level of competition from other S-LFPSs and from 
some recently built public schools. Focused S-LFPSs are characterized by having a middle and lower 
middle-class student population and, in general, surprisingly little presence of students coming from 
the surrounding squatter settlements. In all cases, schools in this group are relatively new, established 
less than 25 years ago. 
In order to sustain or improve their position in the local hierarchy, they usually deploy more 
tactical responses, especially trying to target middle or lower middle-class families as a way of gaining 
differentiation from other S-LFPSs and public schools. In this sense, they may develop some 
alternative pedagogical approach9—although barely innovative and poorly implemented—or to offer 
low-cost non-academic extracurricular activities, but of a certain symbolic value, aimed at attracting 
middle-class families (e.g., recreational activities, art workshops).  
Principal: In the morning we teach the official curriculum. In the afternoon we do 
workshops and different activities. [In the afternoon] we put the groups together, so 
first and second-graders, one; third and fourth, two; fifth and sixth, three. Then we 
have three large groups. 
 
 
9 Some of these schools may also develop non-traditional niches to increase their trade area—e.g., a “caring” 
teaching style or integrating middle-class students with special educational needs. 




Researcher: And who gives these workshops? 
 
Director: Well, it’s usually some teacher who works full day, or some support 
teacher, or girls who are finishing their studies to become teachers. (Principal, Private 
company school) 
 
Interestingly, schools in this group tend to be equally or even more selective than those pursuing a 
highly-selective logic of action. However, selection practices in this case are focused almost 
exclusively on assessing behavioral aspects and the socioeconomic background of the applicants.  
There is an admission process including a small test, to know where they come from, 
a small interview with the family... And sometimes, a small test with the educational 
psychologist, to see if... That is, no one is discarded for his or her knowledge, but we 
evaluate whether this is the best school for that family, whether we can help. 
(Principal, NPO school) 
 
First there’s an interview with the educational psychologist. Parents also have to 
bring a report from the previous school or kindergarten. What we try to do is...not to 
select, but to see if the kid would fit in the group. We interview the parents too, and 
then there is an exam to see if the child... It’s not a qualifying exam...it’s kind of 
diagnostic. We don’t want the kid to feel he/she is out of place. (Principal, Catholic 
Church school) 
 
Principals in this group tend to offer more circuitous explanations, arguably struggling to avoid the 
political (and legal) incorrectness of developing selection practices based on socio-economic 
background. Consequently, they often rely on arguments such as ensuring a “good fit” between the 
school and the family or avoiding situations in which students might feel “out of place”. It is worth 
noting that much of the literature that discusses student selection practices under voucher and 
charter schemes highlights how these practices are often used to shape the social composition of 
schools, generally excluding candidates from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. The 
ambiguity of the notion of “fit” is not, therefore, anecdotal. Indeed, in the face of the political 
incorrectness and moral dilemmas surrounding these matters, it has been observed that schools tend 
to resort to more ambiguous justifications, all of which supposedly put the well-being of the child 
and family above the interests of the institution. 
Missionary S-LFPSs. Finally, the third group is composed by S-LFPSs located in lower 
middle-class areas close to squatter settlements that hold a low position in the local hierarchy in 
relation to other S-LFPSs, but medium or high as compared to neighboring public schools. These 
schools experience a high perception of competition and account for a mostly low-class student 
population and, to a lesser extent, lower-middle class. In general, these are long-standing schools, 
originally established by and linked to the social mission of some secular or religious organization.  
Missionary schools are unable to compete with other S-LFPSs: They face important 
limitations in terms of infrastructure and teach the basic curriculum while trying to sustain the level 
of demand developing low-prestige non-traditional niches—often accepting “problematic” or 
repeating students from other S-LFPSs. Consistently, ex ante selection practices are scarce or 
nonexistent and non-re-enrollment is limited to cases of severe behavioral problems. 
Overall, we have kids mostly coming from other schools in the neighborhood. They 
come because there’s some kind of difficulty in between. We are a small school and 
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we have a support teacher, which allows us to work in a more individualized way. So, 
for example, we receive kids from school X; no repeaters accepted there. School Z, 
the same. No repeaters. (Principal, NPO school) 
 
In order to build differentiation from public schools, missionary S-LFPSs either (a) 
emphasize elements such as security, a “familiar”, safe and caring teaching climate; or (b) 
build a very basic set of symbolic attributes—e.g., low-cost uniforms, take-home books, 
keeping graffiti off the schools’ façades.  
Parents reject public schools because they are a disaster. Children take drugs at the 
school entrance because they have ‘free hours’ when teachers don’t come to work 
and so they go in and out of school without control. Those things do not happen at 
this school. Here they are safe and supervised. […] We know each and every one of 
our kids and we take good care of them. (Principal, school C) 
 
These are expressive schools (by default) where principals and teachers develop “missionary” 
professional ethics seeking to maintain a good school climate. They avoid disruptions or incidents, 
while try to raise academic performance through more personalized teaching. Additionally, given the 
families’ predominantly low socio-economic status, schools in this group are unable to collect extra 
fees by offering extracurricular activities. Infrastructure limitations make it also impossible to raise 
the number of students per class. Their economic sustainability is, thus, based on austerity measures 
and the use of primary level classrooms to teach secondary level in the afternoon shift. 
Discussion 
The introduction of a supply-side subsidy policy meant a fundamental change in educational 
provision affecting structural variables in the Argentine educational system. The progressive public-
private dualization resulting from this change had its epicenter in the biggest urban areas of the 
country and, in particular, the city of Buenos Aires. As with other PPPs schemes, supply-side 
subsidy policies entail a restructuring of traditional bureaucratic-centralized provision models. With 
the shortcomings and nuances observed, and motivated ultimately by a criterion of productive 
efficiency, the policy seeks to ensure equal opportunities and freedom of choice for disadvantaged 
families. As described, unlike most PPPs schemes, supply-side subsidy policies seek to satisfy these 
or other objectives without fostering competition among schools. 
In this article we have analyzed this policy in action (Felouzis, Maroy, & van Zanten, 2013), 
examining how the normative framework affects S-LFPSs’ practices to assess the extent and 
conditions under which these practices follow or depart from the policy goals. In this sense, we 
identified a series of competitive responses developed by S-LFPSs in relation to the demand, 
emerging from their interpretation and translation of the rules of the game and incentives provided 
by the policy framework (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012; Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011). The 
analysis of these responses has evidenced certain links, regularities and discontinuities among the S-
LFPSs of the sample. Although the analysis is specific to S-LFPSs in Buenos Aires, we believe it 
provides a good frame for thinking about the nuances in various types of schools more generally. 
We have thus synthesized these patterns in a heuristic typology of logics of action helpful to 
understand the different ways in which S-LFPSs address the educational needs of families in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. A number of crosscutting issues and implications emerge from this 
analysis that need to be discussed further. 




First, proponents of market policies in education tend to perceive supply-side subsidy 
schemes as unattractive PPP models (Patrinos et al., 2009; Tooley & Longfield, 2015). This is mainly 
because, unlike other forms of PPPs such as school vouchers, supply-side subsidies would not 
generate the level of competitive pressure on schools necessary to unleash the supposedly virtuous 
mechanisms typically associated with models of non-bureaucratic provision (Lubienski, 2006; 
Verger, Bonal, et al., 2016). However, the indirect nature of the link between funding and enrollment 
together with the subsidy eligibility criteria in the case of the city of Buenos Aires do not seem to 
result in a decrease in competitive intensity. As evidenced, S-LFPSs deploy a very varied set of 
competitive practices aimed at increasing enrollment and ensuring the necessary material resources 
to “remain in the business”. Strikingly, even with the nuances mentioned, these practices do not 
differ significantly in nature from those observed in a priori more competitive environments 
determined by demand-side funding policies (Jabbar, 2015; Woods et al., 1998; Zancajo, 2017). Our 
findings suggest that, as van Zanten (2009) acutely points out, competitive pressure and competitive 
responses from schools are to be expected in any educational system where resources are not 
allocated completely through bureaucratic procedures, and not only in the few national and 
subnational cases that have indeed introduced formal quasi-market reforms. In the same vein, our 
findings suggest that although privatization may not automatically imply the establishment of 
markets, it does help to create favorable environments for the development of competitive links 
among the actors (Marginson, 1993). In fact, as our study shows, marginalization via student 
selection can produce market effects without an actual education market policy. 
Second, on many occasions, PPPs are adopted to promote educational innovation and 
diversification and, accordingly, expand choice opportunities for families. Nonetheless, some have 
shown that bringing the private sector in is not always a synonym for diversifying educational 
approaches taken by schools (Jabbar, 2015; Lubienski, 2009; Verger et al., 2018). In fact, private 
schools are usually those that are more sensitive to accountability and competitive pressures in the 
context of PPPs, which is why they tend to adopt teacher-centered and traditional forms of 
education (Lubienski, 2003; Zancajo, 2018). Although the normative framework of Buenos Aires’ 
subsidy policy does not make explicit reference to these objectives, diversification and innovation 
constitute elements frequently attributed to the private sector and added discursively as ex post policy 
goals by many government officials—arguably as a means of legitimation and as a way to 
symbolically “update” the policy to current global policy discourses. However, while the 
heterogeneity of the S-LFPS sector is evident in terms of profit/non-profit status, fee amounts, and 
religious orientation, the analysis of less evident, strictly educational features of these schools tends 
to question some assumptions. Thus, for example, regarding the type of academic practices 
developed by S-LFPSs, we identified a somewhat isomorphic process characterized by a relative 
convergence concerning the type of curricular design; extracurricular activities; (traditional) 
pedagogical approach; management-driven innovation (alliances to achieve economies of scale, 
development of “portfolios” of schools); and a certain tendency to standardize teaching practices, 
most frequent in schools pursuing a highly-selective logic of action. This general trend coexists with 
a series of non-substantive differentiation practices carried out by every S-LFPSs in the sample to a 
greater or lesser extent. On the one hand, on a collective and eminently discursive level, S-LFPSs 
seem to work in coalition heavily criticizing public schools while communicating a series of 
crosscutting symbolic attributes (safety, quality, responsiveness) shaping a somehow “private school 
brand”. On the other hand, at an individual level and strongly conditioned by the internal and 
external constraints faced in each case, S-LFPSs seek to differentiate themselves from each other—
and, eventually, from certain public schools perceived as competitors—offering better facilities, non-
academic extra-curricular activities, or developing some non-traditional (low-prestige) niche offer.  
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Third, the economic viability of S-LFPSs is based on public subsidies and monthly fees paid 
by families. Such scheme somehow forces schools to develop a series of practices to increase 
resources and efficiency. As evidenced in this study, one of the most widespread practices is to 
significantly increase the number of students per class. The striking normative vagueness and, 
ultimately, the lack government oversight, allow S-LFPSs to make intensive use of classrooms and 
human resources addressing operational rather than pedagogical considerations. Moreover, the 
subsidy policy seems to create incentives that reinforce the development of these practices by 
setting, indirectly, an optimum of 50 students per class, thus maximizing the equation of subsidies, 
use of classrooms, and user fees. Additionally, although the normative framework establishes 
maximum fees, it also allows schools to bypass these maximum fees regulations by charging add-ons 
for extracurricular activities, annual tuition, maintenance and equipment expenses, non-educational 
services, among other concepts. On the other hand, there are no restrictions or guidelines for S-
LFPSs that seek to develop alternative financing sources. In this line, some have developed 
sophisticated fundraising schemes aimed at both corporations and individual donors using the 
“affordable learning, poor household targeted” narrative as a legitimating halo. However, very few S-
LFPSs have the capacity or experience to develop fundraising practices in a sustainable manner, 
which tends to generate large inequalities among providers relegating schools (public and S-LFPSs) 
serving mostly marginalized students.  
Finally, one of the most significant findings of this study is the extended use of student 
selection practices among the S-LFPS sector. The pervasiveness of such practices has been also 
observed under other PPP schemes in different contexts around the globe (Carrasco, Gutiérrez, & 
Flores, 2017; Jabbar, 2015; Jennings, 2010; West et al., 2006; Zancajo, 2017). Beyond the 
determinants that generally explain “second-order competition” dynamics (van Zanten, 2009), some 
seem to be fundamental for understanding the case of Buenos Aires: (a) the overall public and 
private educational supply inadequacy in disadvantaged neighborhoods of the city; (b) the existence 
of two different enrollment/admission circuits—i.e., online for public schools and school-based 
face-to-face for S-LFPSs; (c) the absence of government oversight; (d) the extended false 
assumption that private schools are allowed to select students together with the lack of information 
provided by the educational authorities; and (e) the incentive structure of the policy itself that, on 
the one hand, promotes increasing class sizes and, on the other, arguably forces schools to select the 
most academically able or well-behaved students to make it possible to work in large groups. 
Interestingly, the incidence of these factors is such that selection practices are present not only in 
for-profit S-LFPSs, as frequently assumed. In contrast, our results suggest that exposure to 
competitive dynamics may not necessarily impact differently between non-profit and for-profit 
providers regarding the development of certain opportunistic behaviors that tend to widen the gap 
with the public sector (Bano, 2008). 
In conclusion, our examination of the supply-side subsidy policy in Buenos Aires evidences 
that S-LFPSs experience competitive pressures, engage in opportunistic behaviors and deploy a vast 
repertoire of competitive practices to attract students. The competitive scenario we have unveiled 
proves that the legal conceptualization of all schools as public along with the allocation of subsidies 
for private schools independently from enrollment are utterly insufficient measures to avoid school 
competition. Within a context of demand-supply imbalance, deep-rooted normative inconsistencies, 
lack of governmental oversight and deficient regulatory enforcement, S-LFPSs’ competitive logics of 
action hinder the objectives and assumptions on which the supply-side subsidy policy is based on. 
As enacted on the ground, rather than ensuring the right to choose school providing equality of 
educational opportunity, the supply-side subsidy policy may be contributing to shape and deepen a 
highly unequal educational landscape increasing segregation in already marginalized populations. 
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